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Abstract
Deﬁne the riskiness of a gamble as the reciprocal of the absolute risk
aversion (ARA) of an individual with constant ARA who is indiﬀerent
between taking and not taking that gamble. We characterize this index
by axioms, chief among them a “duality” axiom which, roughly speaking,
asserts that less risk-averse individuals accept riskier gambles. The index
is homogeneous of degree 1, monotonic with respect to ﬁrst and second
order stochastic dominance, and for gambles with normal distributions,
is half of variance/mean. Examples are calculated, additional properties
derived, and the index is compared with others in the literature.
JEL classiﬁcation: C00, C43, D00, D80, D81, E44, G00.
Keywords: riskiness; risk aversion; expected utility; decision making
under uncertainty; portfolio choice; Sharpe ratio; variance-mean ratio;
value at risk.
1 Introduction
On March 21, 2004, an article on the front page of the New York Times pre-
sented a picture of allegedly questionable practices in some state-run pension
funds. Among the allegations were that these funds often make unduly risky
investments, recommended by consultants who are interested parties. The con-
cept of “risky investment” is commonplace in ﬁnancial discussions, and seems to
have clear conceptual content. But when one thinks about it carefully and tries
to pin it down, it is elusive. Can one give a clear, precise deﬁnition of riskiness,
one that is independent of the person or entity making the investment?
Conceptually, whether or not a person takes a gamble depends on two dis-
tinct considerations:
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1(i) the attributes of the gamble, and in particular, how risky it is; and
(ii) the attributes of the person, and in particular, how averse he is to risk.
The famous contributions of Arrow (1965, 1971) and Pratt (1964) address
item (ii) by deﬁning absolute and relative risk aversion, which are personal,
subjective concepts, depending on the utility function of the person in question.
But they do not deﬁne riskiness; they do not address item (i). It is like speaking
about subjective time perception (“this movie was too long”) without having
an objective measure of time (“it was two hours long”), or talking about heat
or cold aversion (“it’s too cold in here”) without having in mind an objective
concept of temperature (“it is 20 degrees”).
This paper addresses item (i); it develops a measure of riskiness of gambles.
The concept is based on that of risk aversion: We think of riskiness as a kind
of “dual” to risk aversion—speciﬁcally, as that aspect of a gamble to which a
risk-averter is averse. So on the whole, we expect individuals who are less risk
averse to take riskier gambles.
The gambles treated here yield gains or losses, measured in stated dollar
amounts, with stated probabilities. Needless to say, many real-life gambles are
not of that kind. For one thing, the outcomes may be non-monetary; getting
married (or divorced), adopting a child, quitting one job for another, choosing a
ski resort, deciding on an operation—all are gambles that do not ﬁt the current
framework easily, or indeed at all. Even gambles that are monetary are often
not that well deﬁned, numerically speaking. When we invest in stocks or bonds,
we have at best a rough concept of the probabilities involved; likewise for many
forms of insurance (such as those in which one’s own behavior is an important
parameter, like in automobile accident insurance).
But, to start with, it is important to deﬁne riskiness in principle. The real-
life problems we have mentioned are akin to measurement problems in physics.
That there exists a physically precise deﬁnition of temperature does not imply
that one can always tell just how hot or cold it is in a given place at a given
moment. But before one can even ask that question, one does need to have
the deﬁnition. Similarly, the main purpose of the research described here is to
deﬁne riskiness; once one has the deﬁnition, one can address the problem of
determining—measuring—riskiness in the applications.
One ﬁnal point, essential to understanding our index, is in order: Riskiness is
not the opposite of desirability; a less risky gamble need not be more desirable.
The two concepts are “orthogonal.” Desirability is subjective, depending on
the individual; one individual may prefer gamble g to gamble h, while another
prefers h to g. Riskiness, on the other hand, is objective; it is the same for all
individuals. Given two gambles, a more risk-averse individual may well prefer
the less risky gamble, while a less risk-averse individual may actually prefer the
riskier gamble.
The riskiness index proposed here is not the ﬁrst; others have been proposed,
in disciplines such as ﬁnance, statistics and psychology. We discuss some of those
in Section 7, and compare them with the one proposed here. Basically, what sets
our index apart from these others is that ours is based on economic, decision-
2theoretic considerations, such as the duality principle roughly enunciated above.
An even more basic requirement of this nature is monotonicity with respect to
(w.r.t.) ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance: if the outcome of a gamble g is sure
to be no better than that of h, and is with positive probability actually worse,
or more generally, if each loss or its probability is higher under g than under h,
and each gain or its probability is lower under g than under h, then g should be
riskier than h. Our index satisﬁes this elementary requirement, but surprisingly,
very few in the literature do.
The plan of the paper is as follows: Section 2 is devoted to the basic ax-
iomatic deﬁnition of the index, and its numerical characterization. Section 3
discusses the index conceptually, and relates it to the Arrow-Pratt coeﬃcient of
risk-aversion. In Section 4, the index is characterized in terms of constant ab-
solute risk aversion, as outlined in the abstract. Section 5 sets forth some of the
basic properties of the index, including its dimension (dollars), its monotonicity
w.r.t. ﬁrst- and second-order stochastic dominance, its continuity, its behavior
for “diluted” gambles, normal gambles and sums of independent gambles, and
its ordinal characterization. Section 6 provides numerical examples, meant to
give the reader the beginnings of a quantitative “feel” for the index. Section 7
discusses the literature, and Section 8 is devoted to proofs. Section 9 concludes.
2 Axiomatic Characterization
In this paper, a utility function is a Bernoulli utility function for money, strictly
monotonic, concave,1 twice continuously diﬀerentiable, and deﬁned over the en-
tire real line. A gamble g is a random variable with real values2—interpreted as
dollar amounts—some of which are negative, and that has positive expectation.
Let agent i have utility function ui. Let w be a real number, interpreted as a
wealth level. Say that i accepts g at w if Eui(w + g) >u i(w), where E stands
for “expectation;” i.e., if i prefers taking the gamble to refusing it. Otherwise,
i rejects g at w. Call i at least as risk-averse as j (written i D j) if for all levels
wi and wj of wealth, j accepts at wj any gamble that i accepts at wi. Call i
more risk-averse than j (written i B j)i fi D j and j 4 i.
Deﬁne an index as a positive real-valued function on gambles (to be thought
of as measuring riskiness). Given an index Q, say that “gamble g is riskier than
gamble h” if Q(g) >Q (h). We consider two axioms for Q, the ﬁrst of which
posits a kind of “duality” between riskiness and risk aversion; roughly, that less
risk-averse agents accept riskier gambles. The axioms are as follows:
Duality:3 If i B j, i accepts g at wi, and Q(g) >Q (h), then j accepts h at wj.
1Monotonicity means that the individual likes money; concavity, that he is risk-averse—
weakly prefers the expected value of a gamble over the gamble itself.
2For simplicity, we assume for now that it takes ﬁnitely many values, each with positive
probability. This assumption will be relaxed in the sequel.
3Throughout this paper, the universal quantiﬁer applies to variables that are not explicitly
quantiﬁed otherwise. For example, the duality axiom should be understood as being prefaced
by: “For all gambles g,h, agents i,j, and wealth levels wi,w j,”.
3In words, duality says that if the more risk-averse agent accepts the riskier
gamble, then a fortiori the less risk-averse agent accepts the less risky gamble.
Homogeneity of Degree 1: Q(tg)=tQ(g) for all positive numbers t.
Homogeneity embodies the cardinal nature of riskiness. If g is a gamble,
it makes sense to say that 2g is “twice as” risky as g, not just “more” risky.
Similarly, tg is t times as risky as g. Our main result can now be stated as
follows:
Theorem A: For each gamble g, there is a unique positive number R(g) with
(2.1) Ee−g/R(g) =1 .
The index R thus deﬁned satisﬁes duality and homogeneity of degree 1; and,
any index satisfying these two axioms is a positive multiple of R.
We call R(g) the riskiness of g. Both axioms are essential to the result:
dropping either of them admits indices that are not positive multiples of R.
3 Discussion
3.1 Emphasis on Losses
As we shall see in Section 6, the riskiness index R is much more sensitive to
the loss side of a gamble than to its gain side. Technically, that is because the
exponential on the right side of (2.1) has a positive exponent if and only if the
value of g is negative. Conceptually, too, the idea of “risk” is usually associated
with possible losses rather than with gains; one speaks more of risking losses
than of risking smaller gains.
Many of the indices discussed in the literature (see Section 7.4 and 7.5) also
emphasize losses. But in those cases, the emphasis on losses is built in; the
deﬁnitions explicitly put more weight on the loss side. In the case of the index
R, the deﬁnition as such does not distinguish between losses and gains, and
indeed there is no sharp division between them. The distinction that we do
observe emerges naturally from the analysis; it is not entered artiﬁcially.
3.2 Risk Aversion and Duality
For one agent to be more risk-averse than another in our sense—i B j—is a
very strong requirement. That is because j must accept any gamble that i
does, quite independent of the gamble and the respective wealth levels. It is
precisely this strength that makes the duality axiom highly acceptable: Since
this strong requirement appears in the hypothesis of the axiom, the axiom as a
whole calls for very little, and what it does call for is eminently reasonable.
3.3 Relation with Arrow-Pratt
Arrow (1965, 1971) and Pratt (1964) deﬁne the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aver-
sion of an agent i with utility function ui and wealth w as ρi(w): =ρi(w,ui): =
4−u00
i (w)/u0
i(w). This concept is “local,” in that it concerns i’s attitude towards
inﬁnitesimally small gambles only; in contrast, the concept D of comparitive
risk-aversion deﬁned above is “global,” in that it applies to gambles of arbitrary
size. In this way, the concept D seems more direct, straightforward, and natural;
no limiting process is involved, one deals directly with real gambles.
Another distinction is that the Arrow-Pratt coeﬃcient is deﬁned for a par-
ticular wealth level w only, whereas the concept D abstracts away from wealth,
deals simultaneously with all wealth levels. This ﬁts our purposes well: We
seek a notion of riskiness that depends only on the gamble in question; current
wealth should not matter.
On the other hand, the relation D is only a partial order, whereas Arrow and
Pratt deﬁne a numerical index (and a fortiori, a total order). The two notions
are related by the following:
Proposition 3.1: i D j if and only if ρi(wi) ≥ ρj(wj) for all wi and wj.
4 Characterization in Terms of CARA
An agent i is said to have constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) if his Arrow-
Pratt coeﬃcient ρi(w) is a constant α that does not depend on the wealth w.
In that case, i is called a CARA agent, and his utility u a CARA utility, both
with parameter α. There is in fact an essentially4 unique CARA utility with
parameter α, given by u(w)=−e−αw. While deﬁned in terms of the Arrow-
Pratt coeﬃcient, which is a local concept, CARA may in fact be characterized
(or equivalently, deﬁned) in global terms. Indeed, we have
Proposition 4.1: An agent i has CARA if and only if for any gamble g and
any two wealth levels, i either accepts g at both wealth levels, or rejects g at both
wealth levels.
In words, whether or not i accepts a gamble g depends only on g, not on
the wealth level. CARA utility functions thus constitute a kind of medium or
context in which gambles may be evaluated “on their own,” without reference
to wealth.
Theorem B: The riskiness R(g) of a gamble g is the reciprocal of the number
α such that a CARA person with parameter α is indiﬀerent between taking and
not taking the gamble.
Proof: It follows from (2.1) and the form of CARA utilities.
Note that Theorem B goes a little beyond Theorem A in characterizing risk-
iness; it actually ﬁxes the index numerically, not just within a positive constant.
4Up to an additive and a positive multiplicative constant.
55 Properties of Riskiness
The properties below are proved on the spot, follow immediately from (2.1), or
are proved in Section 8.
5.1 The Parameters of Riskiness
The riskiness of a gamble depends on the gamble only—indeed, on its distrib-
ution only—and not on any other parameters, such as the utility function of
the decision maker or his wealth.
5.2 Dimension
Riskiness is measured in dollars.
5.3 Monotonicity w.r.t. Stochastic Dominance
The most uncontroversial, widely accepted notions of riskiness are provided by
the concept of stochastic dominance (Hadar and Russell (1969), Hanoch and
Levy (1969), Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970); see also Mas-Colell, Whinston and
Green (1995, pp.195-197)). Say that a gamble g ﬁrst-order dominates (FOD)
g∗ if g ≥ g∗ for sure, and g>g ∗ with positive probability; and g second-
order dominates (SOD) g∗ if g∗ may be obtained from g by “mean-preserving
spreads”—by replacing some of g’s values with random variables whose mean is
that value. Say that g stochastically dominates g∗ (in either sense) if there is a
gamble that is distributed like g and that dominates g∗ (in that sense).
An index Q is called ﬁrst- (second-) order monotonic if Q(g) <Q (g∗) when-
ever g F(S)OD g∗. First- and second-order dominance constitute partial orders.
One would certainly expect any reasonable notion of riskiness to extend these
partial orders—i.e., to be both ﬁrst- and second-order monotonic. And indeed,
the riskiness index R is monotonic in both senses.
5.4 Continuity
An index Q is called continuous if it is continuous in the topology of uniform
convergence; i.e., if Q(gn) → Q(g) whenever gn → g uniformly.5 With this
deﬁnition, the riskiness index R is continuous. It is also continuous if we adopt
more demanding deﬁnitions, for example if we replace uniform convergence by
convergence in probability, as long as the gn are uniformly bounded. In either
case, the continuity is not uniform, because as Eg approaches 0, the riskiness
R(g) may approach ∞.
5Equivalently, if for every gamble g and ε>0, there is a δ>0 such that |Q(g∗)−Q(g)| <ε
whenever |g∗ − g| <δfor each of their values.
65.5 Diluted Gambles
If g is a gamble, p a number strictly between 0 and 1, and gp a compound
gamble that yields g with probability p and 0 with probability 1 − p, then
R(gp)=R(g).
Though at ﬁrst this may sound counterintuitive, on closer examination it is very
reasonable; indeed, any expected utility maximizer—risk averse or not—accepts
gp if and only if he accepts g.
5.6 Normal Gambles
If the gamble g has a normal distribution,6 then
R(g) =Varg/2Eg,
where Var stands for “variance.” Indeed, set Varg =: σ2 and Eg =: µ. The
density of g’s distribution is e−(x−µ)
2/2σ
2
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√
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So (2.1) holds with R(g): =σ2/2µ, so that is indeed the riskiness of g.
In the ﬁnance literature, Variance/Mean is sometimes used to measure risk-
iness. We shall see below (Section 7.3) that this is in general not reasonable.
But for normal gambles, it is, as we have just seen.
5.7 Sums of i.i.d. Gambles
If g and h are independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) gambles with riski-
ness r, then g + h also has riskiness r. Indeed, the hypothesis yields Ee−g/r =
Ee−h/r =1 . Since g and h are independent, so are e−g/r and e−h/r, so 1 =
Ee−g/r Ee−h/r =E ( e−g/re−h/r)=E ( e−(g+h)/r), so R(g + h)=r.
5.8 Sums of Independent Gambles
The previous result may be generalized as follows: If g and h are independent,
then the riskiness of g + h lies between those of g and h.
5.9 Ordinality
If we are looking only for an ordinal index—i.e., wish to deﬁne “riskier,” with-
out saying how much riskier—then we can replace the homogeneity axiom by
conditions of monotonicity and continuity.
6As deﬁned in Section 2, a gamble has only ﬁnitely many values; so strictly speaking,
its distribution cannot be normal. We therefore redeﬁne a “gamble” as a random variable g
(Borel-measurable function on a probability space) for which Ee−αg exists for all positive α.
7An index Q for which Q(g) >Q (h) if and only if R(g) >R (h) is called
ordinally equivalent to R. We have already seen that the riskiness index R sat-
isﬁes the duality axiom (Theorem A), is continuous (5.4), and is both ﬁrst- and
second-order monotonic (5.3). In the opposite direction, any continuous and
ﬁrst-order monotonic index that satisﬁes the duality axiom is ordinally equiva-
lent to R. Moreover, continuity, monotonicity and duality are essential for this
result; without any one of them, it fails.
6 Some Numerical Examples
6.1 A Benchmark
A gamble that results in a loss of l with probability 1/e, and a “very large” gain
with the remaining probability, has riskiness l. Formally, if gM,l yields −l and
M with probabilities 1/e and 1−(1/e) respectively; then limM→∞ R(gM,l)=l.
The probability 1/e is that of “no success” in a Poisson distribution with
expectation 1.
6.2 Some Half-Half Gambles
We have just seen that the riskiness of a gamble yielding a loss of 1 with prob-
ability 1/e, and a large gain with the remaining probability, is close to 1. If the
probabilities are half-half, the riskiness goes up to 1/log2 ≈ 1.44, where “log”
denotes the natural logarithm (i.e., to base e). If the gain decreases to 3 (so
the expectation decreases from ∞ to 1), the riskiness goes up again, but not
by much—only to 1.64. If the gain decreases to 1.1—so the expectation is only
0.05—the riskiness jumps to 11.01. As the gain approaches 1—i.e., the expec-
tation approaches 0—the riskiness approaches ∞. The riskiness of a half-half
gamble yielding -$100 or $105 (cf. Rabin (2000)) is $2,100.
6.3 Insurance
To buy insurance is to reject a gamble. For example, suppose you insure a risk of
losing $20,000 with probability 0.001 for a premium of $100—like when buying
loss damage waiver in a car rental. That means that you will end up with −$100
for sure. If you decline the insurance, you are faced with a gamble that yields
−$20,000 with probability .001, and 0 with probability 0.999. If we normalize7
so that rejecting the gamble is worth 0, then the gamble yields −$19,900 with
probability .001, and $100 with probability 0.999. The riskiness of this gamble
is about $2,750.
7You cannot “stay where you are;” you must either pay the premium, which means moving
to your current wealth w less $100, or decline the insurance, which means moving to w−$100
plus the gamble g described in this sentence. That is like choosing between g and $0, from
what your vantage point would be if your current wealth were w − $100.
87 The Literature
There exist other indices in the literature that purport to measure riskiness.
All those of which we know suﬀer from serious deﬁciencies,8 prominent among
which is that they violate the elementary condition of monotonicity w.r.t. ﬁrst
order dominance (M-FOD); indeed, they may rate a gamble g riskier than h
even though h is sure to yield more than g. We will not conduct an exhaustive
review of the literature, but content ourselves with discussing some of the more
prominent indices, and brieﬂy mentioning some others.
7.1 Measures of Dispersion
Pure measures of dispersion like standard deviation, variance, mean absolute
deviation (E|g−Eg|), and interquartile range9 have been suggested as indices of
riskiness; see the survey of Machina and Rothschild (1987). That seems bizarre,
as these indices measure only dispersion, taking little account of the gamble’s
actual values. Thus if g and g + c are gambles, where c is a positive constant,
then any of these indices rate g+c precisely as risky as g, in spite of the fact that
it is sure to yield more than g. An even stranger index (op. cit.) is entropy,10
which totally disregards the values of the gamble, taking into account only their
probabilities; thus a gamble with three equally probable (but diﬀerent) values
has entropy log2 3, no matter what its values are. It seems clear that people
who suggest such measures of dispersion as indices of riskiness are not thinking
of riskiness in the economic, decision-making sense that we are trying to capture
here.
There are other indices that use measures of dispersion, but also factor in
some measure of the gamble’s magnitude, most prominently its mean. We now
discuss two of these; it turns out that they, too, violate M-FOD.
7.2 Standard Deviation/Mean
Standard deviation/mean is related to the Sharpe Ratio, a measure of “risk-
adjusted returns” frequently used to evaluate portfolio selection; see, for exam-
ple, Bodie, Kane and Marcus (2002) and Welch (2005). An odd feature of this
index is that it is homogeneous of degree zero: A half-half gamble yielding $2 or
-$1 is rated exactly as risky as one yielding $2,000,000 and -$1,000,000. Worse,
though, is that the index violates M-FOD; indeed, a gamble that is sure to yield
higher returns than another may nevertheless be rated riskier.
Let g be a gamble yielding −1 with probability 0.02 and 1 with probability
0.98, and h a gamble that yields −1 with probability 0.02, yields 1 with prob-
ability 0.49, and yields 2 with probability 0.49. Note that h never yields less
8Indeed, by (5.9), an index that is not ordinally equivalent to our index R must violate
continuity, or monotonicity, or duality.
9The diﬀerence between the ﬁrst and third quartiles of the gamble’s distribution. So, if
a gamble yields -$100, -$1, $2, and $1000 with probability 1/4 each, then the interquartile
range is $3.
10−
P
k pk log2 pk, where the pk range over the probabilities of the gamble’s diﬀerent values.
9than g, and yields more with probability almost half. The gamble g has mean
µ =0 .96 and s.d. (standard deviation) σ =0 .28, so σ/µ =7 /24 ≈ 0.29. For
h, the numbers are µ =1 .45 and σ =7
√
3/20, so σ/µ =7
√
3/29 ≈ 0.42. Thus
h is rated considerably more risky than g, which is patently absurd. Moreover,
for positive ε, the gamble h + ε is sure to yield more than g; but if ε is small
enough, it will nevertheless be rated riskier.
7.3 Variance/Mean
Variance/mean (σ2/µ) is another index that may be used to evaluate risks. This
does have the “right” dimension—it is homogeneous of degree one—but like σ/µ,
it violates M-FOD. Indeed, the above example works here too. Even simpler is
the following example: let g and h be half-half gambles yielding, respectively,
−2o r4 , and −1 or 17. Then h yields more than g for sure; but σ2/µ = 9 for g,
and = 92/8 > 9 for h. So h is rated riskier than g—an absurdity.
In Section 5.6, we showed that in the case of normal gambles, our riskiness
index R does yield precisely σ2/2µ. But many gambles, especially those in ﬁ-
nance, are very far from normal. For example, one may expect an investment
in high tech either to fall ﬂat on its face or to be wildly successful, with little
inbetween. For such gambles, σ2/2µ may be far from the riskiness. On the other
hand, the normal approximation does make sense for a well-diversiﬁed portfolio,
so in that case σ2/2µ is a good measure of riskiness.
7.4 Value at Risk
Another index used extensively by banks and ﬁnance professionals in portfolio
risk management is value at risk (VaR). This depends on a parameter called
a conﬁdence level. At a 95% conﬁdence level, the VaR of a gamble g is the
absolute value of its ﬁfth percentile, when that is non-positive, and 0 otherwise.
In words, it is the greatest possible loss, ignoring losses with probability less
than 5%. Thus a gamble yielding -$1,000,000, -$1, and $100,000 with respective
probabilities of 0.04, 0.02, and 0.94 has a 95% VaR of $1, and so does the gamble
yielding -$1 and $100,000 with 0.06 and 0.94 probabilities.
This index has various troubles. To start with, it depends on a parameter—
the conﬁdence level—whose “appropriate” value is not clear. Also, this index
ignores completely the gain side of the gamble. In particular, it violates M-FOD.
And even on the loss side, it concentrates only on that loss that “hits” the 95%
level, as the above examples show.
7.5 Additional Indices
Brachinger (2002) and Brachinger and Weber (1997) are good surveys of some of
the more recent literature. In psychology, measures of perceived risk have been
proposed; early studies are Coombs (1969), and Pollatsek and Tversky (1970).
Our index shares some of the rescaling and translation properties proposed by
Luce (1980). Luce’s families of risk measures depend on a host of diﬀerent
10parameters, including transformations of the density of the random variable,
as well as linear combinations of the conditional expectation of gains raised to
some power and the conditional expectation of losses also raised to the same
power. Similar comments apply to the conjoint expected risk model of Luce and
Weber (1988). Fishburn (1977, 1982, 1984) generalizes many of the previous
measures. He also develops indices where losses and gains are treated separately
(see also Jia, Dyer and Butler (1999)).
Sarin’s (1987) risk measures improve upon Luce’s. One of Sarin’s measures,
the closest to the index R,i sE e−g =: S(g). This is monotonic w.r.t. FOSD
and SOSD, so it must violate duality. It also violates homogeneity of degree
1. Indeed, let g be the gamble that assigns probability 0.01 to a loss of 1 and
probability 0.99 to a gain of 2. Then S(2g)=0 .09 < 0.16 = S(g). In contrast,
R(2g)=2 R(g) >R (g). To see now that the index S violates duality, set
α := 1/R(g). By (2.1), a CARA agent i with parameter 5
6α accepts g, while a
CARA agent j with parameter 2
3α—who is less risk-averse than i—rejects 2g,
which is rated less risky than g by S. So S violates duality.
Most of this literature develops families of indices rather than proposing a
single index of riskiness, and it is unclear how to assign values to many of the
parameters upon which the index depends.
8 Proofs
8.1 Preliminaries
In this section, agents i and j have utility functions ui and uj, and Arrow-Pratt
coeﬃcients ρi and ρj of absolute risk aversion. Since utilities may be modiﬁed
by additive and positive multiplicative constants, we may—and do—assume
throughout the following.
(1) ui(0) = uj(0) = 0 and u0
i(0) = u0
j(0) = 1.
Lemma 2: For some δ>0, suppose that ρi(w) >ρ j(w) at each w with |w| <δ .
Then ui(w) <u j(w) whenever |w| <δand w 6=0 .
Proof: Let |y| <δ .If y>0, then by (1),
logu0
i(y) = logu0
i(y) − logu0
i(0) =
R y
0 (logu0
i(z))0dz =
R y
0 (u00
i (z)/u0
i(z))dz
=
R y
0 −ρi(z)dz <
R y
0 −ρj(z)dz = logu0
j(y).
If y<0, the reasoning is similar, but the inequality is reversed, because then R y
0 = −
R |y|
0 . Thus logu0
i(y) ≶ logu0
j(y) when y ≷ 0, so also u0
i(y) ≶ u0
j(y) when
y ≷ 0.
So if w>0, then by (1), ui(w)=
R w
0 u0
i(y)dy <
R w
0 u0
j(y)dy = uj(w), and if
w<0, then ui(w)=−
R |w|
0 u0
i(y)dy < −
R |w|
0 u0
j(y)dy = uj(w), q.e.d.
Corollary 3: If ρi(w) ≤ ρj(w) for all w, then ui(w) ≥ uj(w) for all w.
Proof: It is similar to that of Lemma 2, with i and j interchanged, strict
inequalities replaced by weak inequalities, and the restriction to |w| <δelimi-
nated.
11Lemma 4: If ρi(wi) >ρ j(wj), then there is a gamble g that j accepts at wj
and i rejects at wi.
Proof: W.l.o.g.11 wi = wj =0 , so ρi(0) >ρ j(0). Since ui and uj are twice
continuously diﬀerentiable, it follows that there is a δ>0 such that ρi(w) >
ρj(w) at each w with |w| <δ .So by Lemma 2,
(5) ui(w) <u j(w) whenever |w| <δand w 6=0 .
Choose ε with 0 <ε<δ / 2. For 0 ≤ x ≤ ε, and k = i,j, set fk(x): =
1
2uk(−ε + x)+1
2uk(ε + x). By (5),
(6) fi(x) <f j(x) for all x.
By (6), concavity, and (1), fi(0) <f j(0) ≤ uj(0) = 0. By monotonicity of the
utilities, fi(ε)=1
2ui(2ε) > 1
2ui(0) = 0. So fi(y) = 0 for some y between 0 and
ε, since fi is continuous. So by (6), fj(y) > 0. So if η>0 is suﬃciently small,
then fj(y−η) > 0 >f i(y−η). So if g is the half-half gamble yielding −ε+y−η
or ε + y − η, then Euj(g)=fj(y − η) > 0 >f i(y − η)=E ui(g). So j accepts g
whereas i rejects it, q.e.d.
8.2 Proof of Proposition 3.1
This Proposition is used in the proof of Theorem A.
“Only if”: Assume i D j; we must show
(7) ρi(wi) ≥ ρj(wj) for all wealth levels wi and wj.
If not, then there are wi and wj with ρi(wi) <ρ j(wj). So by Lemma 4, there is
a gamble that i accepts and j rejects, contradicting i D j. So (7) is proved.
“If”: Assume (7); we must show i D j, i.e., that for all wealth levels wi and
wj and each gamble g, if i accepts g at wi, then j accepts g at wj. W.l.o.g.
wj = wi =0 , so we must show that
(8) if i accepts g at 0, then j accepts g at 0.
From (1), (7), and Corollary 3 (with i and j reversed), we conclude uj(w) ≥
ui(w) for each w. So Euj(g) ≥ Eui(g), which yields (8), q.e.d.
8.3 Proof of Theorem A
: For α>0, let uα(x)=( 1− e−αx)/α; this is a CARA utility function with
parameter α. The functions uα satisfy (1), so by Lemma 2 (with δ arbitrarily
large), their graphs are “nested;” that is,
(9) if α>β ,then uα(x) <u β(x) for all x 6=0 .
To see that there is a unique R(g) > 0 satisfying (2.1), set f(α): =E e−αg−1,
and note that f is convex, f (0) = 0,f 0(0) < 0, and f(M) > 0 for M suﬃciently
large. So there is a unique γ>0 with f(γ)=0 , and we set R(g): =1 /γ.
11“Without loss of generality.” For arbitrary wi and wj, deﬁne u∗
i (x): =ui(x + wi) and
u∗
j(x): =uj(x + wj), and apply the current reasoning to u∗
i and u∗
j.
12To see that R satisﬁes the duality axiom, let i,j,g,h,wi,w j be as in the
hypothesis of that axiom; w.l.o.g. wi = wj =0 . Set γ := 1/R(g),η:= 1/R(h),
αi := infw ρi(w),α j := supw ρj(w). Thus
(10) Euγ(g)=( 1 − Ee−γg)/γ =0a n dE uη(h)=( 1 − Ee−ηh)/η =0 .
By hypothesis, R(g) >R (h), so η>γ .By Corollary 3,
(11) ui(x) ≤ uαi(x) and uαj(x) ≤ uj(x) for all x.
Now assume Eui(g) > 0; we must prove that Euj(h) > 0. From Eui(g) > 0
and (11) it follows that Euαi(g) > 0. So by (10), Euγ(g)=0< Euαi(g). So by
(9), γ>α i. By Proposition 3.1, αi ≥ αj, so η>γyields αj <η .Then (10),
(9) and (11) yield 0 = Euη(h) < Euαj(h) < Euj(h), so indeed, R satisﬁes the
duality axiom. That R is homogeneous of degree 1 is immediate, so indeed, R
satisﬁes the axioms.
In the opposite direction, let Q be an index that satisﬁes the axioms. We
ﬁrst show that
(12) Q is ordinally equivalent to R.
If this is not true, then there must exist g and h that are ordered diﬀerently by
Q and R. This means that either the respective orderings are reversed, i.e.,
(13) Q(g) >Q (h) and R(g) <R (h),
or that equality holds for exactly one of the two indices; i.e.,
(14) Q(g) >Q (h) and R(g)=R(h)
or
(15) Q(g)=Q(h) and R(g) >R (h).
If either (14) or (15), then by homogeneity, replacing g by (1−ε)g for suﬃciently
small positive ε leads to reversed inequalities. So w.l.o.g. we may assume (13).
Now let γ := 1/R(g),η:= 1/R(h); then (10) holds. By (13), γ>η .Choose
µ and ν so that γ>µ>ν>η .Then uγ(x) <u µ(x) <u ν(x) <u η(x) for all
x 6=0 . So by (10), Euµ(g) > Euγ(g)=0a n dE uν(h) < Euη(h)=0 . So if i and
j have utility functions uµ and uν respectively, then i accepts g and j rejects
h. But from µ>νand Proposition 3.1, it follows that i D j, contradicting the
duality axiom for Q. So (12) is proved.
To see that Q is a positive multiple of R, let g0 be an arbitrary but ﬁxed
gamble, and set λ := Q(g0)/R(g0). If g is any gamble, and t := Q(g)/Q(g0),
then Q(tg0)=tQ(g0)=Q(g), so tR(g0)=R(tg0)=R(g) by the ordinal equiv-
alence between Q and R, so R(g)/R(g0)=t = Q(g)/Q(g0), so Q(g)/R(g)=
Q(g0)/R(g0)=λ, so Q(g)=λR(g). This completes the proof of Theorem A.
To see that both duality and homogeneity of degree 1 are essential to Theo-
rem A, consider the following two examples. The variance-mean ratio is homo-
geneous of degree 1, but violates duality. The index Q(g)=I[R(g)], where I
denotes the integer part of a real number, satisﬁes duality, but is not homoge-
neous of degree 1.
138.4 Proof of 5.3
For α ≥ 0, set f(α): =E e−αg,f ∗(α): =E e−αg∗. If g FOSD g∗, then f(α) <f ∗(α)
whenever α>0. From this and the proof that (2.1) has a unique positive root,12
it follows that the unique positive root of f∗ = 1 is smaller than that of f =1 ,
so R(g∗) >R (g), as asserted.
If g SOSD g∗, then, too, f(α) <f ∗(α), because of the strict convexity of
e−αx as a function of x. The remainder of the proof is as before.
8.5 Proof of 5.4
For α ≥ 0, set f(α): =E e−αg,f n(α): =E e−αgn; denote the unique positive root
of f =1b yγ, of fn =1b yγn. We have fn → f, uniformly in any ﬁnite interval.
Now f(γ/2) < 1 and f(2γ) > 1. So for n suﬃciently large, fn(γ/2) < 1 and
fn(2γ) > 1, so γ/2 <γ n < 2γ. Suppose that the γn have a limit point γ∗ 6= γ;
arguing by contradiction, we may assume w.l.o.g. that it is the limit. For any
ε>0, we have |fn(γn) − f(γn)| <εfor n suﬃciently large, because of the
uniform convergence. Also |f(γn) − f(γ∗)| <ε ,because of the continuity of f.
So |fn(γn) − f(γ∗)| < 2ε. So limfn(γn)=f(γ∗) 6=1 , contradicting fn(γn)=1 ;
q.e.d.
8.6 Proof of 5.8
By Theorem A, the riskiness R(g + h) is the reciprocal of the unique positive
root of f =1 , where f(α): =E e−α(g+h). Because g and h are independent,
f(α)=E e−αge−αh =E e−αgEe−αh. So if f(α)=1 , then it cannot be that both
Ee−αg and Ee−αh are > 1, and it cannot be that both Ee−αg and Ee−αh are
< 1. So Ee−αg ≤ 1 and Ee−αh ≥ 1, say. So 1/R(g + h)=α ≤ 1/R(g) and
similarly 1/R(g+h)=α ≥ 1/R(h). Thus R(g) ≤ R(g +h) ≤ R(h), as asserted.
8.7 Proof of 5.9
The proof of ordinal equivalence follows that of (12) above. If either (14) or
(15) holds, and Q is ﬁrst-order monotonic, then replacing g by g − ε for suﬃ-
ciently small positive ε leads to reversed inequalities; this follows from ﬁrst-order
monotonicity and continuity. The remainder of the proof of (12) is as above.
To see that ﬁrst-order monotonicity is essential, deﬁne
Q(g): =



R(g), when 0 <R (g) ≤ 1,
1, when 1 ≤ R(g) ≤ 2,
R(g) − 1, when 2 ≤ R(g).
Thus Q collapses the interval [1,2] in the range of R to a single point. It may be
seen that it is continuous and satisﬁes the duality axiom, but is not ﬁrst-order
monotonic; and there are g and h (in the “collapsed” region) satisfying (15), so
Q is not ordinally equivalent to R.
12Near the beginning of the proof of Theorem A.
14To see that continuity is essential, let A be a non-empty proper subset of
the set R−1(1) of all gambles with riskiness 1. Deﬁne
Q(g): =
￿
R(g), when R(g) < 1o rg ∈ A,
R(g)+1 , when R(g) > 1o rg ∈ R−1(1)\A.
One may think of Q as resulting from R by “tearing” along the “seam” R(g)=1 ,
with the seam itself going partly to the upper fragment and partly to the lower
fragment. It may be seen that Q is ﬁrst-order monotonic and satisﬁes the duality
axiom, but is not continuous; and there are g and h (on the “seam”) satisfying
(15), so Q is not ordinally equivalent to R.
Finally, as already argued at the end of Section 7, Sarin’s index S(g)i s
continuous and ﬁrst-order monotonic, but it violates duality.
8.8 Proof of Proposition 4.1
“Only if:” All CARA utility functions have the form −e−αx. Thus i accepts g
at wealth w if and only if −Ee−α(g+w) > −e−αw, i.e., if and only if Ee−αg < 1;
and this condition does not depend on w.
“If:” Suppose i’s Arrow-Pratt index of absolute risk aversion is not constant,
say ρ(w) >ρ (w∗). Consider a gamble yielding ±δ with probabilities p and 1−p
respectively, and let pδ(w) be that p for which i is indiﬀerent at w between taking
and not taking the gamble. Then13 ρ(w) = limδ→0(pδ(w)− 1
2)/δ; i.e., noting that
even-money 1
2 − 1
2 bets are always rejected by risk-averse utility maximizers, the
Arrow-Pratt index is the probability premium over 1
2, per dollar, that is needed
for i to be indiﬀerent between taking and not taking a small even-money gamble.
So, if δ is suﬃciently small, q − 1
2 lies half-way between ρ(w) and ρ(w∗), and g
is an even money gamble yielding ±δ with probabilities q and 1−q respectively,
then i accepts g at w∗ and rejects it at w; this proves the contrapositive of “if,”
and so “if” itself.
9 Conclusion
We have deﬁned a numerical index of the riskiness of a gamble with stated dollar
outcomes and stated probabilities, based on economic, decision-theoretic princi-
ples. Contrary to other indices of riskiness, this index is not one of a family, but
stands alone. It is denominated in dollars, monotonic w.r.t. ﬁrst and second
order stochastic dominance, continuous in about any sense one wishes, homoge-
neous of degree 1, and satisﬁes a duality condition that says, very roughly, that
risk-averters dislike riskier gambles. Moreover, it is the only index satisfying
these conditions.
13E.g., see Aumann and Kurz (1977), Section 6; but there may well be earlier sources.
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